

DAVID SANSONE, *Plato: Republic Book I*, Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics, Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2023, viii+202 pp., 26,83€, ISBN 978-1-108-97047-1.

This commented edition of the first book of Plato's *Republic* is a very welcome and valuable addition to the series of Green & Yellow commentaries on Plato. *Republic I* is interesting in several respects: on the one hand it resembles the earlier dialogues, ending with Socrates' confession of *aporia* with regard to the virtue under investigation; on the other hand it proves to be the proem to the following nine books of *Republic*. It shows us a Socrates who repeatedly confesses his ignorance with regard to the essence of justice but who also expresses his firm conviction that it is better to be just than to be unjust. As such, it is a very suitable text to read in a course on Plato with university students. Sansone's edition provides teachers and students with an excellent working tool. This does not mean that his edition exclusively or especially aims at providing beginners with the help they need to confront Plato's text; on the contrary, it also amply caters for the needs of the advanced scholar. In the following I will discuss the introduction, the text and the commentary. If I will have to make some critical remarks I do so in full appreciation of the rich and sound scholarship to which this splendid book testifies.¹

INTRODUCTION

As was only to be expected the introduction starts with a discussion of the date at which Book I was written, with special attention for the vexed question of whether Book I originally was an independent dialogue, which was later adapted to serve as the introduction to the sequel. After a judicious discussion Sansone (henceforward S.) concludes (p. 7): "In the absence of more compelling evidence and more convincing arguments it is reasonable to proceed on the assumption that *Republic* was conceived as a whole and was written at one time, likely in the 370s

¹ The book is very carefully produced and contains hardly any typos; I have noted the following. P. 2, n. 5, line 4 from top: "Gorgias" should be in italics; p. 76, ll. 16-13 from bottom: "The words' origins ... was congenial": it should be either "origin" or "were"; p. 152, l. 21 from top: 172 d-e > 172d-e (indeed the "minorest" of minor errors); p. 194, l. 11 from top: Platonische > Platonischen; p. 198, l. 4 from bottom: Sofisti > I sofisti. At p. 143, l. 7 from top, I would expect a comma after "justly" but then I am not a native speaker of English. At the end of the note on 328e7 something seems to have gone wrong. With regard to the verb *ἐξαγγέλλειν* the cognate noun *ἐξαγγελος* is mentioned, about which S. writes: "a character in a drama who reports offstage actions, not personal details about the actor playing Medea." I fail to see what this refers to. Could it be a remnant of an earlier version of this note? Another note that confuses me is the brief note at 347a3: "δεῖν: sc. ἔλεγον, at 345e6." On the basis of "sc." one assumes that a verb is to be mentally supplied in order to explain the syntax; and such an *ἔλεγον* is actually found at 346e7. The mention of 345e6 seems to refer to the passage in which the same content was expressed as in 347a3; but that is in fact not the case: 345e6 οὐδέεις ἐθέλει ἄρχειν ἐκόν is referred to at 346e7-8 ἄρτι ἔλεγον μηδένα ἐθέλειν ἐκόντα ἄρχειν.

bc.” S. refrains from discussing the date of *Republic* within the group of dialogues of the middle period, such as *Phaedo*, *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*.

The second part of the introduction is devoted to the aporetic character of Book I. S. rightly draws attention to the fact that in contrast to such dialogues as *Euthyphro*, *Laches* and *Charmides* the first interlocutor, Cephalus, is not an expert with regard to the virtue to be explored.

The third part of the introduction is concerned with the setting of the dialogue. S. rightly argues that certainty about the dramatic date (429 and 413 being the prevailing proposals) cannot be reached, because each date contains chronological inconsistencies, as we find in other Platonic works as well. According to S. the main question with regard to the setting is “why Plato has chosen to set his most ambitious work in the Piraeus at the time of a newly established festival in honor of a non-Greek divinity” (p. 13). S. suggests that this indicates “that we are entering novel territory for both Plato and Socrates” (p. 14). One aspect of this novelty is Socrates’ positive teaching in books II-X. Here I might remark that other dialogues of the middle period, especially *Phaedo* and *Symposium*, also contain positive teaching on Socrates’ part, and it is not beyond doubt that *Republic* precedes these dialogues (cf. above).²

Part four of the introduction deals with the *dramatis personae*. With regard to Cephalus S. points out that this character is interpreted in very different ways, ranging from a man who is only interested in money-making to a pious and virtuous man who exemplifies justice in practice. I fully agree with S.’s conclusion (p. 19) that “Plato intends us to see Cephalus as a basically decent individual who behaves in accord with conventional moral standards, without being prepared to define or defend the intellectual foundation of those standards.” The long passage devoted to Thrasymachus includes the issue of the relation between Plato’s character Thrasymachus and the historical Thrasymachus; S. wisely abstains from a definitive verdict. As to Plato’s motives for choosing his own brothers as Socrates’ main interlocutors of the dialogue I would tentatively suggest that the cooperative attitude of Glaucon and Adeimantus reflects Plato’s assent with what he makes Socrates expound.

TEXT

The final chapter of the introduction deals with the transmission of the text, for which S. refers to the monograph by the present reviewer.³ S.’s text is based

² On p. 29 S. writes: “With *Republic* the character of Plato’s writing, and with it the persona of Socrates, enters a more straightforwardly didactic phase, while still maintaining the conversational mode for which he was noted.” To my mind this statement is over-confident in claiming that *Republic* is the first constructive dialogue.

³ G.J. Boter, *The Textual Tradition of Plato’s Republic*, Leiden 1989.

on Slings' 2003 Oxford edition,⁴ from which it deviates in a number of passages.⁵ S. has not confined himself to consulting the apparatus of the OCT, witness his text and apparatus at 349b5 **πράξεως** Richards and at 353d6 **ἐκείνου** recentiores (especially Par.1810^{pc}, as S. specifies in the note), readings that go unmentioned in Slings' edition. I will discuss some of S.'s editorial choices below, in the section on the commentary. Here I draw attention to one aspect of the text in which I wholeheartedly disagree with S., namely his decision to use *scriptio plena* throughout. Thus the reader will be confronted with **ἦν δὲ ἐγώ** and **ἦ δὲ ὄς**, for which other editions have **ἦν δ' ἐγώ** and **ἦ δ' ὄς**, etcetera. S. defends this decision as follows (p. 35): "The treatment of elision and crasis in papyri, medieval manuscripts and, consequently, in printed texts is inconsistent and incoherent and cannot be held to provide evidence for Plato's practice." I daresay that we cannot blindly assume that our sources exactly represent what Plato wrote but I think it is indefensible to make Plato use *scriptio plena* everywhere. It is true that in our sources there is no consistency in applying elision and crasis but why should we have to assume that in this respect consistency on the part of the authors is obligatory? Elision in prose texts is already found in the earliest inscriptions, especially in the case of grammatical words such as particles and prepositions.⁶ S. goes to the extreme in his policy of introducing *scriptio plena*. He not only writes **ἦν δὲ ἐγώ** and **ἦ δὲ ὄς**, as already indicated above, but he also prints **κατὰ ὄσον** where the sources have **καθ' ὄσον**, **ἔστιν ὅτι** for **ἔσθ' ὅτι**, **ἀπὸ ἵππων** for **ἀφ' ἵππων** etcetera. The collocation **καθ' ὄσον** is found 84 times in Plato; the collocation **κατὰ ὄσον** is found only twice in the whole of extant Greek literature (both times in Rufus); are we really to believe that Plato (and all the others) wrote **κατὰ ὄσον** everywhere and that this was changed into **καθ' ὄσον** in the course of the transmission of the text?⁷ To my mind it is wiser to follow our sources in this respect and to accept inconsistency on the part of the author than putting the text on the Procrustes bed of *scriptio plena*, as S. does.⁸

⁴ S.R. Slings, *Platonis Respublica*, Oxford 2003. Very often, the line numbers in S.'s edition differ from those in the OCT; in this review I will constantly use S.'s numbering. I will also quote passages from Plato as they stand in S.'s edition.

⁵ In n. 107 on p. 35 S. specifies seven textual choices deviating from the OCT which are discussed in the commentary but these are not the only passages in which S.'s text differs from the OCT nor are they the only ones discussed in the commentary. I have not compared S.'s text and the OCT systematically but other deviations noted by me include 329e4 **παραμύθια φασιν** (**φασι παραμύθια** OCT), 345a6 **πειθεις** (**πειθει** OCT; discussed in the commentary), 353a1 **μαχαίρα ἄν** (**μαχαίρα** OCT).

⁶ See A. Alonso Déniz, *Elision*, in G.K. Giannakis, ed., *Encyclopedia of Ancient Greek Language and Linguistics*, <https://referenceworks-brill-com.vu-nl.idm.oclc.org/display/db/eglo> (accessed 1 August 2024) with bibliography.

⁷ For the opposite policy, printing elided forms everywhere, see A. Westermann, *Philostratorum et Callistrati opera*, Paris 1849.

⁸ A case in which the Plato OCT's impose uniformity on the text concerns the preposition **σύν/ξύν** and preverb **συν/ξυν**: the sources alternate between the two forms but the OCT's have **σύν** everywhere (with the notable exception of **ξύν** at *R.* 619b3 in Burnet's edition). Slings, *Respublica*,

COMMENTARY

The commentary is very rich and discusses every aspect of the text that calls for attention: textual criticism, language and style, structure, philosophical content, fallacies and inconsistencies in the argumentation and so on and so forth. Besides the well-known works of reference such as KG⁹ and LSJ¹⁰ it makes ample use of up-to-date tools, such as the recent *CGCG*¹¹ and the still more recent *CGL*.¹² S. has a keen eye for the narratological structure of the dialogue, as is demonstrated in his note on 340a1-d1, where he refers to the recent work by Finkelberg.¹³ In some cases I wondered how on earth S. managed to find a relevant work, as in his note on **σαρδάνιον** at 337a3, where he refers to an article in a medical journal.¹⁴

As already pointed out above, the commentary is not intended for one specific type of readers. Thus it often gives basic information on grammatical and linguistic matters of which I will give some instances. 327c5 “ὡς ἀπιόντες: here, as often with a future participle (*CGCG* §52.41), ὡς expresses purpose or intention”; 331a6 “ἀτάλλουσα = Attic ἀτάλλουσα”; 339c7 “Τὸ δὲ ὀρθῶς: sc. τιθέναι”; 348b1 “ἐν ἑκατέρῳ sc. λόγῳ”; 352d8 “δοκεῖ τί σοι εἶναι ἵππου ἔργον; the accent on enclitic τι is owed to the following σοι.” Other notes are meant for more advanced scholars, such as the note on 327b3 where the accentuation of enclitic ἔ and orthotone ἔ is discussed. S. attracts the readers’ attention to the role of anacoluthon in Plato (e.g. in the notes on 352b7-d1 and 352c1-2). The note on 350b10 is an interesting lesson on the single or double use of the definite article in passages where “two different entities are named.”

S.’s brief synopses of the segments of the text are very illuminative and helpful, e.g. the notes on 338c2-339e7 and 344d1-347a5. The same goes for his analyses of the argument, as in the note on 345d3-4, where S. points out that Socrates identifies the art and the practitioner of the art whenever it suits his argument; see also the note on 353c1-2, where S. notes that “S. creates difficulties for himself by presenting this as an either/or situation”, an observation further developed in the notes on c4 and c8.

xvi-xvii, states that it is certain that Plato varied between the two forms but he nevertheless conforms to the practice of the other OCT’s by printing **σύν** everywhere.

⁹ R. Kühner, B. Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache. Zweiter Teil: Satzlehre*, Hannover 1955⁴.

¹⁰ H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. Stuart Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford 1940⁹ (with *Revised Supplement*, Oxford 1996).

¹¹ E. van Emde Boas a.o., *The Cambridge Grammar of Classical Greek*, Cambridge 2019.

¹² J. Diggle a.o., *The Cambridge Greek Lexicon*, Cambridge 2021.

¹³ M. Finkelberg, *The Gatekeeper: Narrative Voice in Plato’s Dialogues*, Leiden 2019.

¹⁴ G. Appendino a.o., “Polyacetylenes from Sardinian *Oenanthe fistulosa*: a Molecular Clue to *risus sardonicus*”, *Journal of Natural Products* 72, 2009, 962-5. Out of curiosity I consulted the article itself, noting that S. slightly misrepresents its text: while S. states that “Appendino et al. (2009) propose that it refers to lockjaw caused by ingestion of a poisonous herb common in Sardinia” the authors actually write (p. 292): “It even found its way into the mainstream medical lingo as the hallmark of lockjaw (*trismus*), the spasm of the muscles of mastication.”

The commentary brims with keen observations at every level. Thus in the note on 344d3, where Thrasymachus wants to leave the company after his monologue, S. comments: “as earlier the assembled company prevented T. from breaking into the conversation (336b), so here they will not allow him to depart.” In the note on 345b5, where Thrasymachus asks Socrates whether he has to implant the argument into his soul, S. notes that the image of ἐνθῶ “is of masticating food and putting it in a baby’s mouth (...). T. had earlier asked S. if he has a nurse (343a3); here he continues his condescending treatment of S. with the suggestion that he has to “spoon-feed” his dull-witted pupil.” As is often the case with anglophone commentators, S. here and there intersperses his notes with dry humorous remarks, as in his note on 328c2 where he writes: “A προσκεφάλαιον, “pillow,” is literally something on which to rest one’s head, appropriate for someone named Cephalus to sit on (...).” In the note on 329e4 τοῖς γὰρ πλουσίοις πολλὰ παραμύθια φασιν εἶναι S. shows himself a competent composer of Greek verse, suggesting “an original in the form of a trimeter such as παραμύθι’ ἐστὶ¹⁵ πολλὰ τοῖσι πλουσίοις.” Here and there S. expands an in itself helpful note so as to include material that is completely irrelevant in the context of Book I; as an instance I refer to the note on 344d2 ἀθρόον καὶ πολύν, which ends with a description of the *klepsydra* in the lawcourt. In short, the commentary is excellent and I have read it with great pleasure, learning a lot of things that were unknown to me, finding confirmation of my own views in some of S.’s comments and being challenged to re-examine or change my own views where I disagreed with S.

Before embarking on a discussion of some specific passages I would mention two general features of S.’s commentary that cause me some trouble. The first of these is a certain tendency at over-interpretation. I am well aware that it is flatly impossible to reconstruct in each and every case whether or not a reference or allusion in the text was intended by Plato or exists only in the eyes of the interpreter but all the same I think that S. repeatedly reads too much into Plato’s text. I will give some instances. At 327c4-6 Polemarchus’ remark, ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖτέ μοι πρὸς ἅστν ὀρμησθαι ὡς ἀπιόντες, is answered by Socrates with Οὐ γὰρ κακῶς δοξάζεις. In the note on c6 S. contends that the use of the words δοκεῖτε and δοξάζεις “anticipat[es] the distinction that S. will draw at the end of Book Five between δόξα, based on inference, and γνῶσις or ἐπιστήμη, accessible only to the philosopher and based on direct acquaintance with the Forms.” Now in 327c4-6 there is no distinction between the two types of knowledge but only δόξα is mentioned; what is more, the matter at stake here belongs to the world of contingency for which ἐπιστήμη is a priori impossible; finally, we are here involved in a casual conversation, which has nothing to do with philosophy. In the note on 336d6-7 S. discusses “the unthinkable eventuality of a silent S.,” claiming that “[i]n this way P. tacitly alludes to his own role in keeping S.’s voice alive even after his death.” In the note on 345a1-2, where Socrates exhorts Thrasymachus

¹⁵ I hope I’m not too much of a wise guy when I prefer the accentuation ἔστι.

to benefit the people present at the discussion by explaining his views, S. argues that “S.’s appeal is ironic in the extreme, since he is calling upon T. to benefit his audience by explaining to them why he thinks benefiting others is something done only by simpletons.”

A second general issue on which I do not agree with S. is his way of dealing with dubious or patently fallacious reasoning on Socrates’ part. I do not mean that S. fails to signal fallacies in Socrates’ argumentation; quite on the contrary, S. is very good in pointing these out in his commentary. My reservations have to do with S.’s evaluation of these unsound arguments or downright fallacies. S.’s note on 346b1 ends with the remark that “[i]t is hard to believe that P. takes this argument seriously.” Here S. would have done well by pointing out what he thinks were P.’s motives for presenting it to his readers all the same. In the note on 346d4 S. remarks: “S. is hoping that T. – and P. is hoping that his readers – will not notice the fragility of the argument.” Did Plato really hope to fool his readers? I find that very hard to believe. In the discussion of the much-criticised argument at 349b1-350e10 S. writes: “This may allow us to infer that the argument satisfied P.”, but he then continues, “it may be an indication of P.’s gradual abandonment of the Socratic elenchus.” What are we to make of this? Did Plato find the argument satisfactory, or did he not? The reader would have been helped if S. had given a systematic account of how he interprets Plato’s use of fallacy.¹⁶

So much for my general comments on the commentary. I will now turn to a number of individual passages.

327a1 *χθές*: S. notes that *Republic* differs from other reported dialogues such as *Symposium* and *Theaetetus* in that the conversations in the latter dialogues took place some time ago, while the conversation in *Republic* was held the previous day. What S. does not mention (and what to the best of my knowledge has not been mentioned by anyone) is that the setting of *Republic* is physically impossible. The discussion in Cephalus’ house can be assumed to have started early in the evening, let’s say about 6 o’clock. Now the word count of *Republic* is slightly under 90,000; assuming that at normal leisurely speaking speed 100 words fill one minute, a simple calculation teaches us that it takes 15 continuous hours for *Republic* to be spoken from start to finish, which means that the discussion must have ended about 9 o’clock the next morning.¹⁷ But then we have to assume that Socrates almost immediately after the end of the actual conversation started reporting this conversation to Timaeus and his friends, as we read in the opening scene of *Timaeus*. It will have taken him some two hours to travel from Piraeus back to Athens and meet Timaeus c.s. there. His report to these might then have started at noon at the very earliest, and then must have lasted until about 3 o’clock in the following night. Now from the ending of *Symposium* we know that Socrates

¹⁶ The pioneer work in this field is the monograph by R.K. Sprague, *Plato’s Use of Fallacy*, London 1962.

¹⁷ In the note on 328a6 S. points out that those present at Cephalus’ house may have chosen to spend the *παννυχίς* (“all-night celebration”, 328a7) conversing.

was very strong indeed, but this would seem to be too much even for Socrates. Is this just another case of Plato's negligence with regard to the realism of his reported dialogues? Or is this a (hitherto neglected) argument in favour of the hypothesis that Book I originally was an independent dialogue after all?¹⁸ In that case there would be no logistic problem at all.

328d3: according to S. Cephalus considers having conversations “merely a pastime one pursues after the ability to enjoy bodily pleasures has waned.” In reality, Cephalus states that pleasure in discussions increases in the same measure as bodily pleasures decrease, as if they were communicating vessels; that is, he doesn't imply that at an earlier age he did not like having conversations at all.

328e5: S. states that **τοῦτο** is the antecedent of **ὃ δὴ**, which I don't understand; it is better to take **ἐνταῦθα τῆς ἡλικίας** as the antecedent. **τοῦτο** refers to what precedes, namely the question of whether old age is tiresome or pleasant.

330b1-331b7: according to S. Cephalus' grandfather was “a ruthless tycoon” but this negative verdict is not supported by the text; the only thing we learn about him is that he was a very wealthy man, not that he was ruthless.

330d3: S. comments: “Cephalus' confidence regarding what S. can expect when he “is near the point of thinking he is going to die” is ironic given P.'s portrayal in *Apology*, *Crito* and *Phaedo*, of S.'s behavior when he not only thinks but is quite certain he is going to die.” However, Cephalus is not speaking about Socrates specifically but about humans in general (d4 **τις**).

331b7: S. states that for Cephalus wealth is “a means of influencing the gods”; similarly, in the note on 352a10 S. refers to Cephalus' remark at 331b3 as a parallel for the hypothesis that the gods “can be bribed with sacrifices and offerings.” This does not do justice to Cephalus. Making sacrifices to the gods is a religious duty; only excessive sacrifices could possibly be regarded as a way of bribing the gods.

331c6-8: S. states that in 414b-c “verbal falsehoods will on occasion be employed even by the Guardians of Callipolis”; in reality the so-called Noble Lie is not told *by* the Guardians but *to* them.

331e3: S.'s text runs as follows: **Ὅτι; ἢ δὲ ὅς· τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιόν ἐστιν**; the other editions have **Ὅτι, ἢ δ' ὅς, τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα κτέ.** S. explains his punctuation by stating that “the indirect form of the interrogative repeat[s] the direct form used by the interlocutor.” He adduces some parallels, such as *Euthphr.* 2c2 **Ἦντινα**. But for **ὄτι** unpreceded by a preposition this idiom is very rare, probably because **ὄτι** is also a conjunction, which might

¹⁸ In the note on 328a6 (already mentioned in my previous note) S. mentions the fact that “the torch-race, the dinner and the **παννυχίς** are lost sight of (...)” S. comments that the thwarted expectations with regard to these elements of the setting of the dialogue should not be ascribed to “absentmindedness on P.'s part or as evidence for inadequate revision when the independent dialogue that is now Book One was recast as the proem to *Republic*.” But he does not seem to be aware of the chronological problems mentioned by me.

lead to confusion.¹⁹ According to S. the article **τό** places the phrase *τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστωι ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιόν ἐστιν* in quotation marks, for which he refers to *Phlb.* 48c10 **τὸ γνῶθι σαυτόν**; but that is a very well-known phrase, which is not the case with *τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστωι ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιόν ἐστιν*. Finally, S.'s claim that "when an infinitive is the subject of the copula, as below at 335e2, the infinitive normally has no article" is not true: the article can be present or absent; see KG 2.37-39.

332a11: S. interprets the phrase as "I understand (the point you are making), because it is not *what is owed* that one returns to a friend if it is to the friend's detriment."²⁰ I would rather stick to the traditional interpretation, "I understand that it is not what is owed." On S.'s reading, the statement a11-b3 **οὐ-ἀποδιδούς** is presented as Socrates' opinion, whereas in fact Socrates asks Polemarchus whether this is the way in which he (i.e. Polemarchus) thinks we should interpret Simonides' saying (b3 **οὐχ οὕτω λέγειν φηίς τὸν Σιμωνίδην**).

332c2: S. states that in **τὸ προσήκον ἐκάστωι ἀποδιδόναι** the article **τό** does "double duty (...) serving to nominalize both **προσῆκον** and **ἀποδιδόναι**." Thus S. contradicts his own (wrong) statement quoted in my note on 331e3. And in itself the concept of an article "doing double duty" appears very unlikely to me. S. proposes the same interpretation of **τό** representing **τὸ τό** for 340c3-4 *τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον δοκοῦν εἶναι τῶι κρείττονι*, which is different from the present passage: there the article **τό** belongs to **δοκοῦν εἶναι**, "*that which* to the stronger *seems to be* the interest of the stronger."

334c10: S. calls the dative **τούτοις** a "dative of possessor", which is wrong. S. is led astray by his own translation, "Then they have good men as enemies?", which in itself is correct; but, as the translation shows, "as enemies" is predicative with "good men", and this is impossible with a *dativus possessivus*. If a label is to be used, I would vote for *dativus iudicantis* or *dativus incommodi*. Similarly, at 334e2 S.'s translation "for they have depraved friends" is misleadingly wrong; the real meaning is "their friends (i.e. the people who are **χρηστοί**, cf. c1-3) are depraved in their opinion."

335b2: S. labels **δικαίου ἀνδρός** as a "genitive of quality"; in fact it is a special use of the *genitivus possessivus*, as in Latin *patris est filios amare*; see KG 1.372-374. This genitive expresses the one who possesses a certain quality, not the quality itself.

336b4: rightly stating that **ἡσυχία** can refer to motionlessness or to silence, S. argues that "[w]e are thus kept in suspense over the nature of T.'s assault, whether it will be physical or verbal." This borders on nonsense: nowhere in Plato do interlocutors launch physical attacks on their opponents; moreover, two

¹⁹ I have checked the TLG for **ὄτι**; The only occurrence in Classical Greek is Eupolis fr. 128 **ὄτι**; τὸ πυριατήριον, where **ὄτι**; probably refers to a question that has not been preserved. but here confusion with the conjunction seems to be impossible.

²⁰ S. proposes a similar reading of **μανθάνω ὄτι** at 351b6; there too his interpretation appears unlikely to me.

lines before we read that Thrasymachus repeatedly tried to “attack the argument” (**ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου**), not the interlocutors.

337b7: S. argues that the usual **πότερον-ἢ** construction shifts to “but (instead) should I say something other than the true (answer)?” I don’t agree. The **πότερον** sentence ends at **τοῦ ἀληθοῦς** and is picked up by **ἢ πῶς εἶπω. ἀλλά** is used apodotically; see Denniston²¹ 11-13.

337b7: according to S. the subject of the sentence is “the answer”: “not even if it (the answer) is actually one of these”. I’d rather take the phrase to mean, “not even if justice is actually one of these.”

338b3: S. comments: “**χάριν ἀποδιδόναι** “show appreciation,” i.e. pay the fee for tuition.” The “i.e.” puzzles me, because it implies that “showing appreciation” and “paying a fee” are the same thing. S. rightly goes on to point out that “[s]ophists expect their pupils to give them a large monetary payment and also to be grateful for their willingness to share improving wisdom.”

338e3-4: S. states that **ἀπέφηναν τοῦτο δίκαιον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις εἶναι** is ambiguous, meaning either “they proclaim that this (**τὸ σφίσι συμφέρον**) is just for their subjects” or “they proclaim to their subjects that this is just.” S. opts for the second interpretation; I prefer the first one. To start with, the word order favours taking **τοῖς ἀρχομένοις** with **δίκαιον**; and this interpretation is also supported by such passages as 339d6-7 and 341a2.

341a1: S. argues that **μὴ** before **ἀμαρτάνοντα** “marks the participle as conditional.” I don’t agree. In the preceding clause it is stated as a fact that the ruler qua ruler doesn’t make mistakes; the following clause means “and given the fact that he doesn’t make mistakes, he establishes what is best for himself.”²² To my mind **μὴ** with **ἀμαρτάνοντα** is due to perseveration of **μὴ ἀμαρτάνειν**.

341e4: for the phrase **νῦν ἠύρημένη** S. quotes as a parallel *Euthd.* 285b4 **τέχνην ... τὴν νεωστὶ ἠύρημένην**. He then comments: “It is not clear (...) why S. introduces the notion of novelty, which is, in any event, irrelevant to his argument.” S. appears to confuse the present passage with the parallel passage from *Euthydemus*, because in the present passage Socrates does not state that the art of medicine was recently invented. **νῦν ἠύρημένη** means: “the art which, having been invented (at some time in the past), we presently have at our disposal.” Therefore S.’s conjecture **ἀνηύρημένη** for **νῦν ἠύρημένη** is superfluous.

343a7: according to S., the implication of Thrasymachus’ question whether Socrates has a nurse is that she, “after all her efforts, has given up looking after S. since he (...) is ineducable and cannot even (**οὐδέ**) identify “for her” the difference between sheep and shepherd.” But of course Thrasymachus’ question whether Socrates has a nurse is not serious. The fact that, according to Thrasymachus, Socrates doesn’t see the difference between sheep and shepherd is an indication

²¹ J.D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*, Oxford 1954².

²² Rewriting the sentence in direct speech results in something like **ὁ ἄρχων, καθ’ ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστίν, οὐχ ἀμαρτάνει, οὐχ ἀμαρτάνων δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ βέλτιστον τίθεται**.

that he is as stupid as a toddler; his way of expressing his contempt is asking after his nurse.

343e3: according to S. “it is unclear whether this (= **τά γε οἰκεῖα**) is to be taken as subject of **ἔχειν** (...) or as an accusative of respect (*CGCG* §30.14), with the just man as subject.” In the next note, S. takes **μοχθηροτέρως ἔχειν** as “being in a worse condition”, in accordance with the frequent use of **ἔχειν** with adverb. To my mind, it is preferable to interpret the phrase as “have his affairs in a worse condition”, with the just man as the subject of “have”; cf. LSJ s.v. **ἔχω** A.II.13.

345a6: S. prints **πειθεις** with Vind.phil.gr. 89 (in all probability a conjecture) and Ficino (who translates *suades*) instead of the reading of the primary mss., **πειθει**. If **πειθεις** were the transmitted reading I would not have difficulties in accepting it but the fact that it is not makes me suspicious. As possible subjects for the transmitted **πειθει** S. mentions “**ἀδικία** or **τις** or the hypothetical unjust man.” The last one would do very well, to my mind. We need not imagine the perfectly unjust man being actually engaged in a discussion with Socrates; the sense is “the concept of the perfectly unjust man does not persuade me etcetera.”

345d2: S. states that “the “antecedent” of the relative pronoun is **τούτοι** in the following clause.” This is impossible because **τούτοι** is in the final clause which depends on the main clause of which **ἐπὶ ᾧ τέτακται** is a constituent. **ἐπὶ ᾧ** is a relative with embedded antecedent, <τούτου> **ἐπὶ ᾧ τέτακται**. **τούτοι** in the final clause picks up <τούτου> **ἐπὶ ᾧ τέτακται**, but that doesn’t mean that it is the syntactic antecedent of the relative pronoun.

346c1: S. prints **Οὐκ, ἔφη**, against **Οὐκ ἔφη** of the other editions, noting: “whether this or **Οὐκ ἔφη** more accurately represents P.’s intention cannot be determined. It seems, however, that S. changes from direct quotation of T.’s responses to indirect only at c11, where the change is marked by S.’s editorial **μόγισ**.” Although this is a keen observation I think we should rather stick to the usual **Οὐκ ἔφη** here. The formula occurs frequently, both in Plato and elsewhere. On the other hand, when in Plato an interlocutor starts his answer with **οὐκ** it never stands alone but it is always followed by one or more other words, e.g. **Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ἔφη** (*Phd.* 64c9); **Οὐκ, ἄν γε ἐμοὶ πεῖθη** (*Phd.* 89b7); **Οὐκ, ἔφη, ἔγωγε** (*Chrm.* 167e9).²³

347c1: with regard to **αὐτοῖς** S. remarks that “its position marks it for contrast.” In fact, the *casus obliqui* of **αὐτός** behave like enclitics and as such are regularly found in Wackernagel position.

347d1: S. is puzzled by the addition of **οὐδὲ ὁμοίως**, “seemingly contradicted by what is said next.” I think the phrase can be explained by assuming that Socrates is talking here about the complete group of rulers (the later philosopher-kings) as

²³ For alternating direct and indirect answers cf., e.g., *Euthd.* 286c9-d10 *Συνεχώρει*. — Πότερον οὖν ψευδῆ μὲν λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι, δοξάζειν μὲντοι ἔστιν; — Οὐδὲ δοξάζειν, ἔφη. — Οὐδ’ ἄρα ψευδῆς, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, δόξα ἔστι τὸ παράπαν. — Οὐκ ἔφη. — Οὐδ’ ἄρα ἀμαθία οὐδ’ ἀμαθεῖς ἀνθρώποι· ἢ οὐ τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη ἀμαθία, εἴπερ εἴη, τὸ ψεύδεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων; — Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. — Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. — Οὐκ ἔφη.

such. There is no group which is superior to this class nor is there another group which has the same capacities as the group of the philosopher-kings.

351a3-5: with regard to **δικαιοσύνη** and **ἡ ἀδικία** S. notes: “as is often the case with abstract nouns, it is not clear why the article appears with one but not the other.” In this specific case I think there is an explanation. In a3 there is no article with **δικαιοσύνη** because it is preceded by two nouns (**σοφία τε καὶ ἀρετή**) which together constitute the predicate. At a5, **ἐπειδήπερ ἐστὶν ἀμαθία ἡ ἀδικία**, the article is needed to make it unambiguously clear that **ἀδικία** is the subject and **ἀμαθία** the predicate; without the article the syntactic roles of the two could easily be interchanged.

351e3: S. thinks that this refers to “two cities or other groups”; in the note on 351e9-352a1 he states that Socrates “will begin to ask about injustice in individuals only at 352a5.” I don’t agree. In the first place, I don’t see why Socrates should speak about injustice between “two cities or other groups”; cities or groups do not necessarily have to cooperate, and the whole argument is based on the assumption that injustice makes effective cooperation impossible. In the second place, the concept of injustice working within one individual, which is entirely novel and which is the cornerstone of the argument of *Republic* as a whole, is carefully prepared. Injustice at work within a larger group (d5-e1) is easily understood; the same goes for injustice creating discord between two people (e2-3). But before sketching the effects of injustice within the individual Socrates first makes Glaucon concede that injustice **ἐν ἐνί** does not lose its power (e6-7). The three steps are subsumed in 351e9-352a3, where **ἄλλοι ὅτιοιόν** is neuter (as S. rightly notes) and stands for “anything you can think of”, including the “one.” Now that the ground has been sufficiently prepared Socrates can take the final step and explain that the effects of injustice within the individual are the same as those within a group. The unjust man is in discord with himself, which robs him of the capacity to be effective in his actions.

CONCLUSION

Although I do not agree with S. on each and every issue I hope that I have made it abundantly clear that I have great admiration for S.’s work. His learned and judicious commented edition will be an indispensable and much appreciated working tool for Platonists for many years to come.

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