Fuera de foco: un análisis estratégico de la campaña guerrillera del Che Guevara en Bolivia (1966-67)
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Abstract
Este artículo analiza los factores estratégicos que resultaron en el fracaso de la
campaña guerrillera lanzada por el Che Guevara en Bolivia en los años 1966 y 1967. El artículo
examina los errores estratégicos cometidos por el Che, que resultaron en el aislamiento rural y
urbano de la guerrilla, y su desconexión del entorno político boliviano. Entre ellos, la elección de
Bolivia como lugar para establecer un foco revolucionario, la decisión de comenzar la campaña en
el sureste del país, o la incapacidad de Guevara para recabar apoyos en la izquierda boliviana o el
movimiento minero. Asimismo, se valora cómo el contexto internacional de la época, con la ruptura
sino-soviética en ciernes y una creciente influencia estadounidense en Latinoamérica, afectaron al
desarrollo de los acontecimientos. El artículo concluye que la fallida campaña del Che demostró la
inviabilidad de exportar la teoría del foco insurgente a un escenario diferente al de Cuba
This article analyses the strategic factors that resulted in the failure of the guerrilla campaign launched by Che Guevara in Bolivia in the years 1966 and 1967. The article examines the strategic miscalculations committed by Che, which resulted in the rural and urban isolation of the guerrillas, as well as their disconnection from the Bolivian political spectrum. Among these miscalculations, the choice of Bolivia as the place to launch a revolutionary foco, the decision to start the campaign in the southeast of the country, or the inability of Guevara to gather support from the Bolivian left or the miners movement. The paper also weighs up on how the international context of the time, with the Sino-Soviet split and a growing American influence in Latin America, affected the course of events. The article concludes that the failed revolution of Che in Bolivia proved the unfeasibility of exporting the insurgency theory of the foco to a scenario different from that of Cuba
This article analyses the strategic factors that resulted in the failure of the guerrilla campaign launched by Che Guevara in Bolivia in the years 1966 and 1967. The article examines the strategic miscalculations committed by Che, which resulted in the rural and urban isolation of the guerrillas, as well as their disconnection from the Bolivian political spectrum. Among these miscalculations, the choice of Bolivia as the place to launch a revolutionary foco, the decision to start the campaign in the southeast of the country, or the inability of Guevara to gather support from the Bolivian left or the miners movement. The paper also weighs up on how the international context of the time, with the Sino-Soviet split and a growing American influence in Latin America, affected the course of events. The article concludes that the failed revolution of Che in Bolivia proved the unfeasibility of exporting the insurgency theory of the foco to a scenario different from that of Cuba







