La Historia como argumento: el uso de la conquista normanda en la obra de los Levellers y Diggers
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Abstract
El fin de este ensayo es proponer algunas objeciones a la tesis
en tres partes de Quentin Skinner en la que se afi rma que para los Levellers
y sus aliados (i) la historia y, en particular, la conquista normanda,
se usa únicamente como un medio para ilustrar un número de argumentos
que se podrían establecer de una manera más abstracta, (ii) que no
tratan la evidencia histórica como si expresara una fuerza prescriptiva y
que (iii) como sugirió Hobbes, la historia ofrece sólo ‘ejemplos de hecho’,
nunca un ‘argumento de Derecho’. Parece, sin embargo, que sobre
la evidencia que nos proporciona el estudio del vocabulario político de
algunos tratados de los Levellers y de Winstanley que las proposiciones
(i)-(iii) no se pueden mantener como una explicación histórica correcta
de las principales reivindicaciones políticas que se expresan en esos
tratados.
The aim of this paper is to arise some objections to Quentin Skinner’s three part thesis that for the Levellers and his allies (i) history and, in particular, the Norman conquest, is used only as a means of illustrating a number of arguments also capable of being more abstractly stated, (ii) that they treat the historical evidence as carrying no prescriptive force and (iii) that they recognise instead that, as Hobbes was to put it, history can offer only ‘examples of fact’, never ‘argument of Right’. It appears, however, that on the basis of the evidence furnished by the study of the political vocabulary of some Levellers’ and Winstanley’s tracts that propositions (i)-(iii) can no longer be maintened as a correct historical explanation of the main political claims those tracts are meant to support.
The aim of this paper is to arise some objections to Quentin Skinner’s three part thesis that for the Levellers and his allies (i) history and, in particular, the Norman conquest, is used only as a means of illustrating a number of arguments also capable of being more abstractly stated, (ii) that they treat the historical evidence as carrying no prescriptive force and (iii) that they recognise instead that, as Hobbes was to put it, history can offer only ‘examples of fact’, never ‘argument of Right’. It appears, however, that on the basis of the evidence furnished by the study of the political vocabulary of some Levellers’ and Winstanley’s tracts that propositions (i)-(iii) can no longer be maintened as a correct historical explanation of the main political claims those tracts are meant to support.







