Los límites de la amnistía
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Una norma de amnistía es legítima si es una ley de un legislador democrático, si su ámbito de intervención es igualitario y si, en atención a su necesidad y a sus costes, no resulta desproporcionada. En relación con el requisito de proporcionalidad: la amnistía de los delitos de tortura, desaparición forzada y ejecuciones extralegales, arbitrarias o sumarias constituye una vulneración de los derechos fundamentales a no padecer tales agresiones, pues tales derechos incorporan a su contenido directo la persecución judicial y la protección normativa; este coste podría llegar a ser asumible en función de los importantes frutos democráticos que pretenda la amnistía, salvo que se trate de una amnistía radical —que afecte a la totalidad de la represión o a su cabeza—, por suponer una renuncia a la prevención de estos delitos.
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An amnesty is legitimate if it is a law enacted by a democratic legislator, if its scope of application is nondiscriminatory and if, considering its need and its cost, it is not disproportionate. As for the proportionality: amnesty for the crimes of torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions is a violation of fundamental rights to be free from such attacks, as these rights incorporate in their essential content the criminal prosecution of their breaches and the legal protection from them; this cost could become acceptable in consideration to the significant democratic gains that amnesty seeks, unless it is a radical amnesty —that is, an amnesty for all the acts of repression or that extends to the leaders of such repression—, because in this case amnesty amounts to a waiver of crime prevention.
An amnesty is legitimate if it is a law enacted by a democratic legislator, if its scope of application is nondiscriminatory and if, considering its need and its cost, it is not disproportionate. As for the proportionality: amnesty for the crimes of torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions is a violation of fundamental rights to be free from such attacks, as these rights incorporate in their essential content the criminal prosecution of their breaches and the legal protection from them; this cost could become acceptable in consideration to the significant democratic gains that amnesty seeks, unless it is a radical amnesty —that is, an amnesty for all the acts of repression or that extends to the leaders of such repression—, because in this case amnesty amounts to a waiver of crime prevention.







