RT Journal Article
T1 Weighing hierarchical power and active contribution in cooperative games with authorization structure
A1 Alarcón Carrero, Antonio Carlos
A1 Gallardo Morilla, José Manuel
A1 Jiménez Losada, Andrés
AB Cooperative games model situations in which a group of players work together tomake a profit. Frequently, in cooperative situations there are dependency or hierarchicalrelationships between the players, which must be taken into account whenallocating the common profit obtained by the grand coalition. Multiple structureshave been used in the literature to model those relationships, and several values havebeen proposed, but there is something in common in all of them: if a player can vetothe participation of another in any coalition, then both players will receive the sameshare of the profit derived from the active cooperation of the vetoed player. In otherwords, actively cooperating and giving permission to cooperate are equally valued.In many situations this is neither fair nor realistic. In this paper we introduce a familyof allocation rules for cooperative games with authorization structure, whichreward positional power less than active cooperation.
PB Springer
SN 0171-6468
SN 1436-6304 (electrónico)
YR 2024
FD 2024-07
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10272/25316
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10272/25316
LA eng
NO Alarcón, A. C., Gallardo, J. M., & Jiménez-Losada, A. (2024). Weighing hierarchical power and active contribution in cooperative games with authorization structure. In OR Spectrum. Springer Science and Business Media LLC. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-024-00779-7
NO Funding for open access publishing: Universidad de Sevilla/CBUA.Support of the Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades, grant PID2022-138956NB-I00.
DS Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Huelva
RD 31 may 2026