RT Journal Article
T1 A new family of solutions for graph-restricted cooperative games: rethinking the weight of intermediary power
A1 Alarcón Carrero, Antonio Carlos
A1 Gallardo Morilla, José Manuel
A1 Jiménez Losada, Andrés
AB In graph-restricted cooperative games, a group of agents, represented by the nodes of a graph, work together to make a profit. However, two agents can cooperate within a coalition only if they are connected by the graph in the coalition. Several allocation rules have been proposed for these games, but there is something in common in all of them: if a player is an indispensable intermediary to communicate with the players in a coalition, this player will receive, at least, the same share of the profit generated by the coalition as the players who belong to it. In other words, intermediation power is valued, at least, as much as active cooperation. In some situations, this is neither fair nor realistic. In this paper, we introduce a family of values for graphrestricted games that value intermediary power less than active cooperation. 
PB Wiley
SN 0969-6016
SN 1475-3995 (electrónico)
YR 2024
FD 2024
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10272/25251
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10272/25251
LA eng
NO Alarcón, A. C., Gallardo, J. M., & Jiménez‐Losada, A. (2024). A new family of solutions for graph‐restricted cooperative games: rethinking the weight of intermediary power. In International Transactions in Operational Research. Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.13573
NO This research has been supported by the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación of Spain under grant PID2022-138956NB-100.
DS Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Huelva
RD 14 jul 2026